At the heart of this book is H.L.A. Hart`s distinction between the “external” and “internal” point of view. Allan, following Ronald Dworkin, took an overt interpretive approach and preferred the internal point of view. An outside observer might say about a jurisdiction where Parliament is sovereign that a law requiring all blue-eyed babies to be killed is legally valid. However, to look at things from the outside is to take the wrong perspective with respect to the common law. What matters is how lawyers (and citizens) would interpret such a law: the popular notion that parliamentary sovereignty ultimately takes precedence over the rule of law is false. Parliament`s authority is limited by its dependence on language; And words take their color out of the larger context in which they are used. We determine the content of Parliament`s instructions in the light of the fundamental legal principles that give the British Constitution its enduring authority and conceptual structure. Rather, the content of the statute is a complex matter of interpretation in which the legislation must be integrated into an existing network of statutes based on both common law and law. (pp. 35-37).
Introduction1. Constitution and constitutionalism2. Constitutional Convention: Practice and Principles.3 Rule of law: freedom, justice and justice4. Parliamentary sovereignty: authority and autonomy.5 Legislative supremacy and the rule of law.6 Constitutional Basis for Judicial Review.7 Judicial review and deference.8 Democracy, fundamental rights and common lawAppendix: Public Law and Political Theory. Is there anything in store for you? We appreciate all feedback aimed at boosting the power and accuracy of PathFinder. If you would like to suggest a change to the note in this document by PathFinder, please send us a message below. For administrative lawyers, “[a] mistaken focus on competing sources of administrative law characteristic of legal positivism has diverted attention from the subtle practicalities of legal interpretation in some cases” (p. 229). From the internal perspective of the public advocate, enforceability – or susceptibility to review – is rather a function of the concrete legal challenge to the exercise of power in all circumstances. It`s.
The result of a legal analysis and not of a straightjacket that restricts their course from the beginning. (L. 58) `); doc.close(); } } this.iframeload = function () { var iframe = document.getElementById(iframeId); iframe.style.display = “; setTimeout(function () { setIframeHeight(initialResizeCallback); }, 20); } function getDocHeight(doc) { var contentDiv = doc.getElementById(« iframeContent »); var docHeight = 0; if(contentDiv){ docHeight = Math.max( contentDiv.scrollHeight, contentDiv.offsetHeight, contentDiv.clientHeight ); } return docHeight; } function setIframeHeight(resizeCallback) { var iframeDoc, iframe = document.getElementById(iframeId); iframeDoc = ((iframe.contentWindow && iframe.contentWindow.document) || iframe.contentDocument); if (iframeDoc) { var h = getDocHeight(iframeDoc); if (h && h != 0) { iframe.style.height = parseInt(h) + `px`; if(typeof resizeCallback == « function ») { resizeCallback(iframeId); } } else if (nTries. My only problem with Allan`s approach is that he perhaps privileges the internal point of view too much, whereas in legal practice, lawyers and judges alternate between the internal and external point of view, arguing on the merits of the individual case on the one hand and explaining how it can be reconciled with existing authorities on the other. I think Allan is aware of the need for lawyers to take two points of view: his epilogue contains a penetrating analysis (even reconstruction!) of Dworkin`s distinction between adequacy and justification. The multidisciplinary content found in HeinOnline is organized into a hierarchy of topics we call PathFinder. And a clear distinction between constitutional law and administrative law cannot be easily made: Based on a combination of human curation and artificial intelligence, PathFinder assigns topics to documents and then organizes them into broader topics. As servants of a sovereign parliament, the courts must ensure that ministers and executive bodies respect the terms and limits of their statutory mandates; And in the application of the law (one assumes), judges can largely take the content of these legal mandates for granted. It was a major theme of this book that, on the contrary, the content of the law is always a matter of interpretation, dependent on value judgments that cannot be circumvented by any responsible legal reasoning. What Parliament has allowed a public servant or agency to do in certain circumstances is always a matter of discretion and reflects thoughtful opinions about what it would be reasonable (or unreasonable) to approve in such circumstances. The meaning of the legislative instructions cannot be separated from the current context: they derive their meaning from the overall tradition of governance to which they contribute.